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BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By Benjamin Kidd. London and New York : Macmillan & Co., 1894. Pp. 348.

This book has already attracted a good deal of attention in the newspapers and reviews of Great Britain, and has been widely read and discussed in America also. The favorable opinion which has been very generally passed upon it I find myself unable to share (I am obliged to speak in the first person singular), and I am, therefore, in honesty compelled to make my notice of it polemical in character. I must first, however, attempt to state very briefly what appear to me to be Mr. Kidd's main theses. (1) In the region of biology he accepts the theory of Weismann, according to which natural selection is the sole factor in evolution, use-inheritance being excluded (*Cf.* p. 34). (2) Human history can only be understood properly and can only become a science if the biologist carries his methods into it (p. 28). (3) Throughout the whole volume Mr. Kidd identifies "progress" with "evolution" (*Cf. e.g.* p. 34). (4) There is "no rational sanction for human progress" (ch. iii.). By this Mr. Kidd means that the individual has no personal interest in the progress of society; he assumes that "reason" is entirely selfish in its dictates. (5) Since religion has everywhere existed, it must serve the interests of evolution: the function of religion is to lead the individual by *supra*- or *ultra*-rational sanctions to act in the interests of social progress. (6) Modern democratic movements are due primarily to the influence of altruistic sentiment which is due entirely to religion. Social evolution does not diminish competition, but brings all mankind into the rivalry of life on conditions of equal social opportunities (pp. 227, etc.). But (7) the "Anglo-Saxon," having the greatest social efficiency, does and always will dominate the world (see ch. x.).

These propositions seem to me a fair summary of Mr. Kidd's main argument. Those who accept them all will doubtless admire his work. Those who cannot may at least find the consideration of them profitable and suggestive—of various things. To me every one of these theses, in the form in which it is maintained by Mr. Kidd, seems either false or misleading. I shall try to give my reasons as briefly as possible.

(1) I agree with Mr. Kidd in regarding the Lamarckian and Spencerian theory of use-inheritance as at least "not proven;" but in considering biological theories in their applicability to human society, it is a very grave omission to say nothing about *artificial* selection, which has indisputably played a great part in the development of all domesticated plants and animals, not excluding the domesticated human being. Mr. Kidd omits all reference to sexual selection as a factor in evolution. In considering the problems of human society, he entirely ignores the fact that, while natural selection has been interfered with and the survival of the unfit promoted, owing to artificial selection due to customs, prejudices, religious beliefs, philanthropic sentiment, etc., the ill effects of this partial cessation of natural selection may conceivably be counteracted by rational artificial selection (see *e.g.* pp. 192, 210).

(2) Human history cannot be understood properly, if the biologist transfers his methods and conceptions uncritically into a much more complex sphere. What should we think of a mathematician or a physicist or even a chemist who regarded his methods as all-sufficient in biology? Mr. Kidd, indeed, recognizes the struggle between societies as a factor differentiating social evolution from the evolution with which the biologist as such is concerned; but he does not recognize that the struggle between societies necessarily brings about a greater internal cohesion within the more successful society and therefore a diminution in the competition between individuals. The social and sympathetic instincts of man within the society to which he belongs (family, class, or nation) are a factor to be taken account of and must continue to be "selected," apart from (or in spite of) the influence of particular religions. Even what is called the struggle for existence between human "individuals" is mainly, in all societies that have yet existed, a struggle between families, and not between mere individuals. This the "individualist"—so called—is constantly forgetting.

Mr. Kidd talks of raising history to "the dignity of a science;" he complains that "historical science is still a department of knowledge almost without generalizations of the nature of laws" (p. 27). We need not dispute about the dignity; but the genuine historical student would probably feel that his main concern was with the explanation of particular events, particular institutions, particular persons even, which have an interest and a value for him and for mankind that does not belong to the mere specimens of

genera and species that concern the biologist. Science is occupied with generals or universals, because to understand the individual fully is hopeless and the particulars in mere (sub-human) nature are not of sufficient interest; but scientific history can and must deal with concrete particulars. Mr. Kidd's own excursions into the region of history are not encouraging examples of the value of biological methods, though it would be unfair to judge the value of biological methods by Mr. Kidd's generalizations. His authorities for Greek and Roman history appear to be principally certain rhetorical phrases culled from the pages of Mr. Lecky and Mr. Froude (see ch. vi.). In speaking of the rise of Christianity, Mr. Kidd blindly follows the usual picturesque exaggerations about the intellectual brilliance and moral corruption of the Pagan world over which Christianity gradually triumphed. Every serious student of history knows that there was both an intellectual degeneration and a religious revival going on independently of Christianity and preparing the way for it; while as to morals, it has again and again been pointed out that nearly every age, if judged by the language of satirists and preachers and by the *chronique scandaleuse* of courts and capitals, could be proved to be the most corrupt that ever existed. "The intellectual forces of the time were directly in opposition to Christianity" (p. 124). This is simply not true. Has Mr. Kidd never heard of Alexandrian philosophy or of Stoicism? If he has not thought of Eusebius's "Preparation for the Gospel," he may have come across Archdeacon Farrar's "Seekers after God." The triumph of Christianity over the old civilization is narrated without any mention of the barbarian invasions! (p. 127.) In the Middle Ages we are told by Mr. Kidd "*all* the attainments of Greek and Roman genius are buried out of sight." How, then, did Alfred come to translate Boethius? Why did Virgil lead Dante through the nether world? What of the great fabric of Roman Law? What of the Platonism of Erigena, the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen? Mr. Kidd delights in unqualified universal propositions. In speaking of the old Greek and Roman society, he says: "Infanticide is universal." If so, how could there be a second generation to practise it? The proposition reminds me of the Irishman's biological generalization—that sterility is hereditary. Speaking of the twelfth century, Mr. Kidd says "there was simply no organic continuity between the old life and that which has replaced it." This is biologically scientific history! And yet Mr. Kidd has evidently heard of and approved

the late Mr. Freeman's thesis about the unity of history. In still more startling violation of the historical spirit, we are told that the past, even the recent past, "may be searched in vain for any clue to the solution of the problems that confront us in the future" (p. 6); and yet (on p. 120) we have Mr. Kidd blaming the French people for having cut themselves off from the past. On p. 140 we are told that "slavery, for the first time in history, became extinct in Europe, somewhere about the fourteenth century." I suppose Mr. Kidd takes no account of serfdom in Russia, Prussia, etc. But if "the development has never been interrupted," how are we to account for the rise and prodigious growth of slavery again in America under Christian powers—yes, and, as even Mr. Kidd has to admit, under his altruistic, humanitarian "Anglo-Saxons"? (p. 168). British encouragement of the slave-trade is never mentioned. The British nation is supposed to have been "persistently" (although quite thanklessly and unobtrusively) making efforts towards the suppression of the slave-trade (p. 159). Nothing is said about the very recent date at which the movement began. On p. 23 occurs this sentence: "That illustrious school of political philosophy which arose in England with Hobbes and Locke, and which earlier in this century [*sic*] had attained to such wide influence in the writings of Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo, and Mill, has towards our own time become unduly narrowed and egotistical largely through its own success." Now, apart from the awkward and ambiguous phrasing and the curious chronology suggested by it, what does this sentence mean to any one who knows anything of these writers? In whom has "the school" become more narrow and egotistical (I suppose he means "egoistical") since Hobbes? and since Ricardo? On p. 109 we read "As the family expanded in favorable circumstances into a related group (the Latin *gens*), and the *gens* in turn into clans (*phratriari*) [*sic*], and these again into tribes (*phylai*), etc." Why this odd mixture of Latin and Greek, or what is meant to be Greek?

(3) Every careful biologist (the qualification is unfortunately necessary) recognizes that evolution is not identical with what we mean by progress. Even in the biological sphere, success in the struggle may be attained by degeneration as well as by advance. And as to social evolution, has not Professor Huxley very well said that the being who survives a free fight proves his ability to survive a free fight, but no other kind of ability? The rise of ethical ideals may be explained *historically* in terms of natural selection;

but when these ideals have once arisen, they make social progress become something different from mere organic evolution, though, of course, such progress must, for a metaphysical theory, fall within evolution as a conception applicable to the universe as a whole.

(4) For Mr. Kidd's assumption that reason is always entirely selfish in its dictates, I find no other evidence given than a twice-quoted grumble of Mrs. Mona Caird's about "the absurd sacrifice to their children of generation after generation of grown people" (pp. 210, 294). It is true that the old-fashioned Utilitarians were apt to argue as if ethical and political problems must be settled simply by referring to the pleasures and pains of the individuals now existing—a form of Utilitarianism expressly discarded by Professor H. Sidgwick ("Elements of Politics," pp. 34, 35) and quite inconsistent with any form of evolutionary ethics, whether idealistic or not. "The central fact," says Mr. Kidd, "with which we are confronted in our progressive societies, is that the interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising [*sic*] it at any time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable." What sense is there in talking about a social *organism* at all, if this dogmatic assertion of absolute antithesis between the part and the whole be seriously meant? What does Mr. Kidd mean by "personal" when he talks of the individual having no personal interest in the progress of the "organism" to which he belongs? (p. 64). What is the content of any one's personal interests if *all* reference to the well-being of *all* other persons be rigidly excluded? Is Mr. Kidd's rationalistic individual going to live a hermit's life? On p. 103 Mr. Kidd speaks of "that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic," implying that there *may* be *some* interests of the individual and of the organism which are not antagonistic. This is a more intelligible view; but it contradicts what is said elsewhere (*e.g.* on pp. 64 and 78).

(5) The counterpart of Mr. Kidd's abstract conception of the individual's reason, as necessarily and absolutely selfish, is to be found in his conception of religion as necessarily anti-rational and necessarily altruistic and subservient to social progress. It might well be asked how, if the mere fact that religion has everywhere existed proves that it is socially useful, the fact that reason has existed at least as universally is consistent with its being everywhere anti-social? But apart from this difficulty in Mr. Kidd's arbitrary

application of the idea of natural selection, of how many actual religions is his theory true? Even within Christianity, how does it apply to the individualistic soul-saving, which till quite recently has been a very general characteristic of those who have most loudly proclaimed themselves Christians? On pp. 89 and 90 Mr. Kidd gives a collection of fifteen definitions of religion,—to illustrate the conflicting conceptions prevalent on the nature of religion. But this list, which is curious both in its inclusions and in its omissions (*e. g.* Schleiermacher's historically famous definition of religion as "the feeling of dependence" is conspicuously absent), contains definitions of *professedly* different subjects: *e. g.* a sarcasm of Ruskin's about "our national religion" ("the performance of church ceremonies and preaching of soporific truths, or untruths, to keep the mob quietly at work while we amuse ourselves") is put alongside of Comte's definition of his own "Positive Religion" ("the worship of Humanity"), and both these alongside of attempts to define religion so as to include all religions (*e. g.* the quotation from Gruppe), a psychological analysis of the religious sentiment (taken from Bain), and philosophical statements of the idea of religion according to various theories. On the other hand, several of the definitions quoted do not conflict with one another at all: *e. g.* Seneca's phrase, "To know God and imitate Him," includes both those philosophical definitions (*e. g.* of Hegel and Professor E. Caird) which lay stress on the element of knowledge and those (*e. g.* of Kant, Matthew Arnold, and Huxley) which lay the stress on conduct. Thus the conflict and confusion are largely of Mr. Kidd's own creation. His own definition is to be found on p. 103: "It is evident that our definition of a religion, in the sense in which alone science is concerned with religion as a social phenomena [Mr. Kidd has confessedly made the definition to suit his own theory], must run somewhat as follows:

"A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." He adds, "We have here the principle at the base of all religions." Have we? Such a definition would exclude some religions altogether, and a great part of every historically famous religion. It is conspicuously true indeed of the Jewish religion and of the political religions of Greece and Rome that they furthered the social coherence and,

on the whole, the success of the societies which observed them. But how does such a conception apply to Buddhism, or to the Christianity of the early centuries, which produced what Mr. Kidd himself calls an "epidemic of asceticism"?

Again, with regard to the great mass of the lower religions, it may very well be doubted whether it is correct to say that they provide "ultra-rational" or "supernatural" sanctions. The "supernatural" is a concept relative to a definitely asserted theory of what is natural or rational. To pre-scientific thought there is, properly speaking, no *super*-natural occurrence. Nature, for the primitive and unscientific mind, includes demons, fairies, gods, patron-saints, miracle-working images, charms, etc., which cause events in the same sort of way in which for the scientific mind electricity, magnetism, etc., cause events. The distinction between a natural and a supernatural sphere is the result of incipient rationalism or scepticism, as we see *e. g.* in Herodotus who, like many people after him, seeks to get rid of mythological difficulties by supposing a "pre-human" or heroic age in which more wonderful things might be expected to happen than in his own day. What *we* call the supernatural is not such to those who really believe in it and have not been taught to speak a language due to rationalistic thought. The supernatural has to be envisaged as a quasi-natural region. The absolutely ultra-rational is the absolutely unthinkable, is that in which nobody can believe, however loudly they protest their belief.

On the other hand, of the higher religions it is quite false to deny that they contain a very considerable rational element. Christianity succeeded in conquering the Græco-Roman world partly just because it took up into itself a great part of the philosophic thought of Greece and of the political organization of Rome. It is historically absurd to regard the religion that was preached by Paul and whose doctrines were formulated by Augustine and Athanasius as standing in a merely antagonistic relation to reason. *Credo quia absurdum* is a formula that will only serve to summarize Tertullian. When Mr. Kidd says (p. 113) that "all [religions] assert uncompromisingly that the rules of conduct which they enjoin have an ultra-rational sanction, and that right and wrong are right and wrong by divine or supernatural enactment, *outside of, and independent of, any other cause whatever,*" his remark may be true of a great deal of popular religion, but he will have to exclude every Thomist theologian from the ranks of Christianity.

In fact, a more careful study of history would show that it is only because and in so far as a religion becomes rational that it really and in the long run furthers social well-being. (Mr. Kidd simply begs the question when he asserts that "a rational religion is an inherent contradiction in terms," p. 101.) This, I take it, is, if we try to put the matter briefly, the significance of the Protestant Reformation and the explanation of the greater social success of Protestant communities. Protestantism introduces a large element of reason into the popular religion,—primarily to be used only in the interpretation of Scripture, but certain to be used more freely in the long run. Mr. Kidd thinks otherwise. He believes he is able to understand the Reformation better than the historian "with the methods at his command" [!] has hitherto been able to do. "Its immediate significance was that, while it represented an endeavor to preserve intact the necessary super-rational sanction for the ethical ideals of the Christian religion, it denoted the tendency of the movement which had so far filled the life of the Western peoples to find its social expression. It liberated, as it were, into the practical life of the peoples affected by it, that immense body of altruistic feeling which had been from the beginning the distinctive social product of the Christian religion [How then can it be an essential characteristic of *all* religion?]; but which had hitherto been, during a period of inactivity and intense vitality, directed into other channels" (p. 154). (It is worth noting how the leading metaphor here is not biological, but merely physical or mechanical.) But why the Protestant revolution caused this "body of altruistic feeling" to flow into practical and social channels is just the very matter that needs explanation; and the very matter which Mr. Kidd does not attempt to explain. Translate his metaphorical language into plain English, and what does his theory come to mean? Not that Martin Luther appealed from the external authority of the Church to the conscience and reason of the individual as the interpreter of Scripture, but that Martin Luther the monk married a nun, and this was the true outcome of the asceticism of the hermits of the Thebaid! Most people would call it a reaction towards the civic ideals of pre-Christian antiquity and a revolt against the *irrational* altruism of mediæval religion. Progress, according to Mr. Kidd's view, is only possible if the multiplication of the species goes beyond the limits which the average conditions of life completely provide for (p. 37, etc.); so that a religion which exalts virginity above marriage would seem to be necessarily

anti-social. But the meaning of the seemingly anti-social asceticism of early Christianity only comes out, according to Mr. Kidd, in this combination in Protestant countries of numerous families with humanitarian sentiment. The objection that unreasoning humanitarian sentiment frequently contributes to the survival of the unfittest Mr. Kidd brushes lightly aside as "what can hardly be possible" (p. 155); but he gives no proof that it is not possible, no proof that it does not happen, except that it runs counter to his theory which supposes all humanitarian sentiment—provided only that it is irrational—to be conducive to social progress.

On p. 153 occurs a characteristic example of Mr. Kidd's incapacity to understand the religious ideas of the past, except in the light of modern sentiment. "At a period," he says, "when the history of the ancient empires still formed a kind of lustrous background, in the light of which the deeds of men continually tended to be judged, the typical vision of the Church was always [*sic*] of the knight

Who, in many climes and without avail,
Had spent his life for the Holy Grail;

but who found it at last in the cup and the crust which he shared with the outcast leper." This, however, is not the typical vision of the mediæval church, but the invention of the author of the "Biglow Papers," who, in a prefatory note, distinctly claims the plot of "Sir Launfal" as his own.

The existence of religions and beliefs and usages, which seem to us of an obviously anti-social and anti-progressive character, is a very important and very difficult problem for the student of human evolution; but the problem is not solved by a mere assertion that religion is and must be anti-rational and yet conducive to social progress. In leaving this subject, I would only call attention to the following considerations, in justification of my criticisms of Mr. Kidd: (*a*) There is a social instinct independent of religious sanctions (it exists in germ among all gregarious animals), and many kinds of religion and many elements in religion frequently conflict with this instinct, though some forms of religion and some elements in all religions may lend support to it. (*b*) Rational considerations may support and supplement this social instinct, and it is chiefly those forms of religion which are largely permeated by the direct or indirect effect of rational considerations that lend support to the social instincts of mankind. (*c*) Mr. Kidd entirely neglects the

extent to which in a fairly-settled condition of society "survivals," which, under other circumstances would be destructive of a society, may continue without doing sufficient injury to lead to their disappearance through natural selection,—*e.g.*, human sacrifices, mutilations, ascetic practices injurious to social efficiency, celibacy of many of the best individuals, etc., may continue to be practised, because counterbalanced by the social cohesion which arises from the sharing in and defending of a *common* religion. Mr. Kidd also neglects the possibility of what Weismann has very well called "bye-products" of evolution,—*i.e.*, the appearance of variations, which subserve no social utility, but which may not be sufficiently hurtful to be eliminated by natural selection.

(6) Mr. Kidd frequently appeals to the abolition of slavery as a proof of the effects of altruistic religious sentiment. Now there is undoubtedly a sense in which it may be said that Christianity led to the abolition of slavery, but it is the same kind of sense in which it may also be said that Christianity, through the Protestant Reformation, produced the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the French revolution. But, on the one hand, there is clear evidence that slavery was already attacked by Greek rationalism in the age of the Sophists, long before Christianity existed: on the other hand, there is clear evidence that Christian theologians, Catholic and Protestant, were almost unanimous in approving the rightness of slavery until after the rationalistic movement of the eighteenth century had begun. Undoubtedly, Christianity gave the slave religious rights equal to those of the freeman; but from that to the abolition of slavery was a long step, not easily taken, and there was no continuous progress towards it. To mitigate and "humanize" an institution may even be to hinder its abolition by removing its more obvious evils. Furthermore, while modern humanitarian sentiment, influenced, however, by reflection and by rationalistic theories about equality, has, undoubtedly, contributed to the abolition of slavery, other causes, economic and political, have co-operated in bringing about the change. It is utterly unscientific to trace historical events to isolated single causes (as Mr. Kidd does, *e.g.*, on p. 182). As a rule, only those people among whom slavery had already disappeared became aware of its evils. I have already referred to Mr. Kidd's complacent tone about the attitude of the British nation towards slavery and the slave-trade. He seems quite unaware that slavery was *formally* abolished by the rationalistic French Convention long before the Christian philanthropists in the

British Parliament succeeded in doing anything practical. Its abolition in the French colonies was, indeed, only formal: the institution was restored, along with the Catholic religion, by Napoleon.

In examining the socialistic movement, Mr. Kidd begins by setting aside France, Germany, and the United States of America on various grounds, and proposes to study "the developments of the modern spirit in England alone" (p. 197), an easy way of simplifying the problem. This spirit he finds in *laissez-faire*. "Its spirit," he says, "still pervades the entire political life of all lands into which these people have carried their institutions" (p. 201). What of Victoria and New Zealand, with their experiments in State-socialism? Nay, if we limit our attention to Great Britain alone, it is quite untrue to say, as Mr. Kidd does, on page 157, that to secure for each individual "a free rivalry with his fellows" has been the object of *all* modern legislation. What of factory acts, and all those acts interfering with freedom of contract, which are more and more in this country characteristic of legislation? Mr. Kidd has nowhere explained how "equal *social* opportunities" are to be secured for all mankind without a system of socialistic legislation: nor how natural selection (which, if violence be suppressed, means for the unsuccessful death by starvation), is to be "humanized" (p. 226) without being to a great extent counteracted. Mr. Kidd admits that "the conception of the native equality of men" is essentially irrational (p. 184); but, apparently, he expects that his socially efficient "Anglo-Saxon" will take care to be sufficiently rationalistic (and, therefore, selfish) to prevent the inferior races, —*e.g.*, the negro, from really attaining to the equality professedly given to him. "The Anglo-Saxon, driven by forces inherent in his own civilization [a phrase as "scientific" as that about opium putting you to sleep because of its soporific virtue], comes to develop the natural resources of the land [possessed by barbarians], and the consequences appear to be inevitable." "The natives must go." I do not know whether the cynicism is intentional or not in Mr. Kidd's appreciative accounts of the manner in which equality is secured to the negro in the Southern States (p. 51), and of that in which without war (*sine sanguinis effusione* in the old pious style), the "Anglo-Saxon" is "involuntarily" exterminating inferior races (p. 58).

(7) With regard to Mr. Kidd's frequent and proud references to the victorious Teuton or "Anglo-Saxon"—that model man after

Mr. Kidd's own heart who succeeds so well because he can combine the philanthropic cant of Exeter Hall with the competitive morals of the stock-exchange and the prize-ring—the following problems may be suggested. Why is nothing said in favor of the Irish, who are certainly a religious people, who often seem an irrational people, and who have the virtue (for natural selection) of multiplying beyond the means of subsistence? What proportion of English-speaking people at the present day have any claim to be considered ethnologically "Anglo-Saxon"? Anglo-Celtic comes less far from the truth. What is to be said of the curious historical phenomenon of this century—the relative retrogression of Teutonic domination in Europe? Germany is united, it is true; but under the supremacy of Prussia, largely Slavonic, so far as race goes. Italy is no longer ruled by the Teuton. Hungarian and Slav have asserted their independence. The English (in the narrower sense) have to make concessions to the "Celtic fringe." Lastly, what may come of the Latin immigration into South America?

In discussing the nature of human evolution, Mr. Kidd concludes that it is not primarily intellectual. He gives some good arguments to show how there is no natural selection of the best intellectual powers, while there is selection of the qualities that go to produce social efficiency. He takes, indeed, too little account of the fact that these qualities are not the same at all times, and that in some periods they imply more intellectual elements than at others. He exaggerates in supposing that the average person of European race to-day is greatly inferior to the average Athenian of the time of Pericles (p. 253). But he sees quite correctly that the apparent intellectual progress of mankind is due to social and not to biological inheritance, to "mental equipment" and not to "mental capacity" (p. 271). He fails, however, to notice the bearing of this on the problem of social evolution generally. He continues to think that a type of civilization,—*e.g.*, that of France, is doomed because the race does not increase with the same rapidity as the Teuton. He takes no account of the fact that every immigrant into France is assimilated by French civilization, so that the French type is perpetuated, whereas the overflow of the superfluous population of Germany into the United States and other countries adds nothing to the continuance of the distinctively German type of civilization. The effect of German universities on American students probably counts for far more in the long run than the whole Teutonic migration in spreading and perpetuating German culture.

For social evolution this assimilative capacity of a people may be far more important than their physical multiplication. Latin civilization was Latin and is Latin still, though every one of the Roman families that fought against Hannibal may have been extinct by the time of the Antonines. If no descendant of the New England Puritans survived on the American continent, we can hardly doubt that many of the characteristics of the New England type of civilization would still be perpetuated. Of course, this power of assimilation is within limits, fixed by the capacity of different races for taking on or for transmitting a type of civilization.

Finally, a protest is necessary against Mr. Kidd's manner of writing. On one page (123) are to be found the following adjectives and phrases: "remarkable spectacle," "the phenomenon of a gigantic birth," "fierce ebullition of life," "extraordinary," "vast," "profound," "immeasurable," "immense," "amorphous vigour of life." The passage is about the Christian religion. After all these gigantic births, fierce ebullitions, etc., comes the anti-climax "From the very beginning its action was altogether unusual." "To once more briefly revert" (p. 164) is a vile phrase. "The motive force behind it has had its seat and origin in that fund of altruistic feeling with which our civilization has become equipped" (p. 185). "If we look back once more over that ethical movement which we have regarded as the seat of the vital phenomena we are witnessing, and which projects itself with such force and distinctness through the history of the European peoples, it may be perceived that it is divided into two clearly-marked stages" (p. 147). What image can the word "seat" present to Mr. Kidd's mind? "The movement of a certain class of minds towards the Church of Rome, the most conservative and uncompromising of all the Churches, which began in England in the middle of the century, etc." These few examples may suffice in addition to those already incidentally given. It is to be feared that such frequent confusion in language goes along with a very considerable confusion in thought, a confusion that renders possible that nauseous muddle of sentiment which shrinks with horror from war and from slavery, and yet approves unchecked competition—"a friendly rivalry" is Mr. Kidd's phrase—as a means of securing the survival of the fittest, a competition which is perfectly useless for the purpose, unless it means the starvation of the unsuccessful. Mr. Kidd's subject is one of surpassing importance, and he has done well to raise the problem of the influence of popular religious

beliefs on social progress; but the problem for its solution would need a wider and more careful study of history than is shown in this volume, and a greater absence of false abstractions, arbitrary assumptions, and hasty generalizations.

D. G. RITCHIE.

OXFORD.

ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP. John MacCunn, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, University College, Liverpool. Glasgow: Mac-Lehose & Sons, 1894.

This is a timely book. When we are being flooded in response to a popular demand with hand-books on the Duties of Citizenship, it is well to have the subject treated from a wider point of view by so competent a writer as Professor MacCunn has shown himself to be. "The object of the following pages," he tells us in the Preface, "is to connect some leading aspects of democratic citizenship with ethical facts and beliefs."

In the first Essay, which is upon "Equality," the key-note is struck. The abstract equality of the French Revolution is set aside. "Those who attempt to level" (quoting Burke) "never equalize." The ground of equal legal and political rights is found in the germ of human Worth which is latent in every rational soul. If there is a ground for the so-called social right of the individual to have deliverance from the conditions of degrading poverty secured to him it must be looked for in the same direction. The second Essay is upon "Fraternity," for which, threatened though it is by the intensified competition of modern times, the writer finds guarantees in the family and the Greek virtue of friendship (these private affections, he finely says, must not be thought of as spending themselves where they rise, but are "like waves that break in unexpected music upon shores that knew nothing of the winds that raised them") in the humanitarian feeling which emancipated the negro slave at the cost of £20,000,000, and in the growing sense of industrial dependence of one class, and even one country and continent on another. In the third Essay, upon the "Rights of Man," Mr. MacCunn carries his principle a step further. A right is regarded as a claim whether recognized by law or not put forward in the name, not of what man is or has been, but of what, under favorable circumstances, he may become. As against the leaders of the French Revolution, Bentham was right in demanding a utilitarian justification of the rights that were claimed; Burke,